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Abstract
Action plans are not generated from scratch for each movement, but features of recently generated plans are
recalled for subsequent movements. This study investigated whether the observation of an action is sufficient to
trigger plan recall processes. Participant dyads performed an object manipulation task in which one participant
transported a plunger from an outer platform to a center platform of different heights (first move). Subsequently,
either the same (intra-individual task condition) or the other participant (inter-individual task condition) returned the
plunger to the outer platform (return moves). Grasp heights were inversely related to center target height and similar
irrespective of direction (first vs. return move) and task condition (intra- vs. inter-individual). Moreover, participants'
return move grasp heights were highly correlated with their own, but not with their partners' first move grasp heights.
Our findings provide evidence that a simulated action plan resembles a plan of how the observer would execute that
action (based on a motor representation) rather than a plan of the actually observed action (based on a visual
representation).
Citation: Seegelke C, Hughes CML, Schack T (2013) Simulating My Own or Others Action Plans? – Motor Representations, Not Visual Representations
Are Recalled in Motor Memory. PLoS ONE 8(12): e84662. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084662
Editor: Corrado Sinigaglia, University of Milan, Italy
Received April 19, 2013; Accepted November 18, 2013; Published December 18, 2013
Copyright: © 2013 Seegelke et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This research was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG; EC 277). Christian Seegelke gratefully acknowledges the financial
support from Honda Research Institute Europe. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of
the manuscript. This does not alter our adherence to all the PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.
Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: Christian.seegelke@uni-bielefeld.de
Introduction
A large corpus of work demonstrates that action plans are
not generated from scratch for each movement, but features of
recently generated plans are recalled and used for subsequent
actions [1–7]. For example, participants in Cohen and
Rosenbaum [1] reached out and grasped a plunger to move it
from a home position (located at a fixed height) to one of five
target positions located at different heights. The higher the
target position, the lower the participants initially grasped the
plunger (and vice versa), indicating that participants anticipated
and planned their actions based on future task demands (i.e.,
the height of the target) and did so that their limbs would be
placed in comfortable or controllable body postures at the end
of the movement. Furthermore, when participants returned the
plunger to the home position they grasped the plunger close to
where they had grasped it before. Cohen and Rosenbaum [1]
argued that if participants would have generated a new action
plan for the return moves, the object should have been grasped
at a similar height regardless of target height (as the home
platform was located at a fixed height). However, given that
grasp heights for the return moves were similar to those of the
first moves, they postulated that participants created a new
action plan for the first move and then recalled and slightly
modified this plan for the return moves in order to reduce the
cognitive costs associated with action planning.
There is also a corpus of evidence suggesting that action
plans used in action observation are equivalent to that used in
action execution [8], and that observing an action triggers
internal action simulation processes [9,10], and facilitates the
production of similar actions shortly after observation [11–13].
For example, participants in Castiello et al. [12] observed a
grasping action made towards a large or small object and then
performed a grasping movement to either object. Overall, reach
components were faster (e.g., time to peak velocity) and grasp
aperture values were smaller when the observed and self-
executed actions were directed to the same object (e.g., small
observed object and small grasped object), indicating that the
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observation of an action primed the forthcoming execution of a
similar action. Complementing these findings, a number of
neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that similar brain
regions are activated during both action observation and action
execution [14–17], lending further support to the hypothesis
that observing another person’s actions activates the
corresponding representations in the observer’s motor system
by internally simulating the actions.
The first question we addressed in the present experiment
was whether the observation of an action is sufficient to elicit
plan recall processes. Given the work demonstrating that the
visual representation of the observed action is mapped onto a
motor representation of the same action during action
observation [8], it stands to reason that an observer should be
able to recall a simulated action plan and re-use it for their
forthcoming executed actions. To this end, we modified the
sequential grasping and placing task introduced by Cohen and
Rosenbaum [1] to a social interaction scenario. In the intra-
individual task, a single participant performed the entire
sequence (i.e., first and return moves) while another participant
observed the action. In the inter-individual task, one participant
performed the first moves (while the other participant observed
the action), and the other participant (the partner) carried out
the return move. If the observation of an action is sufficient to
elicit plan recall processes, we expected that grasp heights
should be similar regardless of task condition (intra- vs. inter-
individual).
With the second question we aimed at examining what a
simulated action plan ‘looks’ like. Specifically, given that it is
the observer’s motor representation that is activated it should
follow that the simulated action plan should resemble a plan of
how the observer would execute that action (i.e., based on the
motor representation) rather than a plan of the actually
observed action (i.e., based on the visual representation). In
support of this view, previous studies have shown greater
activity in a simulation circuit during the observation of familiar
as well as (physically) learned actions [18–20] suggesting
experience dependent influences on action simulation [21,22].
Previous studies mostly used highly stereotyped actions such
finger tapping [15] or grasping and object [11–13], and thus,
observed and self-executed actions were performed virtually
identical. In the present sequential object manipulation task,
the same action goal (i.e., placing the object onto a specific
platform) could be achieved by different means (i.e., exact
grasp height at the object), and previous research has regularly
demonstrated the presence of individual differences in those
tasks [2,23–26]. Consequently, such a task allows us to
dissociate between whether a simulated action plan is based
on a visual representation or a motor representation. If action
simulation is based on the specific motor representation in the
observer, we expected that participants’ grasp height of the
return moves should be more similar to their own first move




The methodology and consent form for this study were
approved by the ethics committee at Bielefeld University, and
conformed to the declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave
their informed written consent to participate in the study
Participants
12 dyads (mean age = 26.08, SD = 3.68, 7 male, 17 female)
participated in exchange for 5€. All participants were right
handed, as assessed using the Revised Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory [27], had normal or correct to normal
vision, and were physically and neurologically healthy.
Apparatus
The custom built shelving unit (200 cm x 30 cm) was braced
by two legs (Figure 1A). Within the unit, five shelves were
located at 50 cm, 70 cm, 90 cm, 110 cm, and 130 cm height.
On the 90 cm shelf two outer platforms (45 cm x 15 cm) were
positioned 45 cm to either side of the shelving unit midpoint,
and extended 15 cm from the shelf. Another platform (45 cm x
15 cm) could be attached to the center of each of the five
shelves and served as center platform. The manipulated object
was a plunger that had a wooden cylindrical shaft (50 cm in
height, 2.5 cm in diameter) and a circular rubber base (5 cm in
height, 10 cm in diameter).
Kinematic data was recorded from a retro-reflective marker
(10 mm in diameter) placed on the styloid process of the radius
(WRT) on the right hand of each participant, and the base of
the plunger shaft (PB). Data was recorded at 200 Hz using a
ten-camera optical motion capture system (VICON Motion
Systems, Oxford, UK).
Procedure and design
Participants were arbitrarily designated A and B. Participants
stood side by side in front of the outer platforms at a distance
of 90 cm (i.e., one in front of the left platform and the other in
front of the right platform) and 30 cm from the front edge of the
shelving unit (see Figure 1B). At the start of each trial,
participants closed their eyes. The experimenter then attached
the center platform at the appropriate shelf height, and placed
the plunger on the required platform, depending on task
condition.
For the intra- and inter-individual task condition, the plunger
was initially placed on one of the outer platforms (left or right).
After the experimenter verbally indicated which of the two
participants would perform the first move both participants
opened their eyes, and the named participant grasped and
transported the object with the right hand from the outer
platform to the center platform (first moves, outer-to-center)
and then placed the hand back to the side of the body. The
other participant observed the action as it was being
performed. The experimenter then verbally stated which
participant would perform the return move (center-to-
outer).That participant then grasped and transported the object
back to the outer platform. Participants operated only in their
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workspace. Thus, if the plunger was initially located on the left
outer platform the participant standing on the left performed the
first move. Similarly, if the participant on the right was to
perform the return move he or she transported the plunger to
the right outer platform. Thus, in the intra-individual task, a
single participant (e.g., A) performed both the first and the
return move, while the other participant (e.g., B) watched the
action as it was performed. In the inter-individual task, one
participant (e.g., A) performed the first move while the other
participant (e.g., B) watched, and then the other participant
(e.g., B) performed the return move.
We also included a control task condition in which we
reversed the temporal order of variable to fixed platform
heights to control for the possibility that participants would
assign greater priority to control at the variable than the fixed
platform positions [1].Thus, the plunger was initially placed on
one of the five center platforms. After the experimenter verbally
indicated which of the two participants would perform the first
move both participants opened their eyes, and the named
participant grasped and transported the object with the right
hand from the center platform to the center platform located on
his/ her side, and then placed the hand back to the side of the
body (center-to-outer).The other participant observed the
action as it was being performed. The experimenter then
verbally stated which participant would perform the return move
(outer-to-center; this was always the participant who performed
the first move in this task).That participant then grasped and
transported the object back to the center platform.
For all task conditions, participants were instructed to
perform the movements at a comfortable speed, and to grasp
the plunger so that it would not slip through their fingers during
the transport. There were a total of 20 trials per participant and
each task (inter- vs. intra-individual vs. control), which
consisted of each possible combination of center shelf height
(50 cm, 70 cm, 90 cm, 110 cm, and 130 cm), and object
position (left, right). Participants performed two successive
trials per condition, which were presented in a randomized
order. The task conditions (intra-individual, inter-individual,
control) were performed in a blocked fashion and the order of
blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Within each
task condition block, participants standing position (i.e., in front
of the left or the right outer platform) was balanced. The entire
experiment took approximately 45 minutes.
Data recording and data analysis
The 3D coordinates of the markers were reconstructed and
missing data (those with fewer than 10 frames) were
interpolated using a cubic spline. The marker coordinates were
filtered using a Woltring filter [28] with a predicted mean square
error value of 5mm2 (Vicon Nexus 1.7). All kinematic variables
were calculated using custom written MatLab scripts
(Mathworks, Version 7.0). Grasp height was calculated as the
vertical distance between WRT and PB, and were extracted
from the first frame where the object was grasped from the
outer platform. Thus, for the intra- and inter-individual task
conditions, grasp heights were extracted at the start of the first
moves (outer-to-center) and at the end of the return moves
(center-to-outer). In contrast, for the control task condition,
grasp heights were extracted at the end of the first moves
(center-to-outer) and at the start of return moves (outer-to-
center).
Results
Grasp height data were analyzed using a 3 task condition
(intra-individual, inter-individual, control) × 2 direction (outer-to-
center, center-to-outer) × 2 object position (left, right) × 5
Figure 1.  Experimental setup.  The participants shown here have given written informed consent, as outlined in the PLOS
consent form, to publication of their photographs.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0084662.g001
Recall of Simulated Action Plans
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e84662
center shelf height (50 cm, 70 cm, 90 cm, 110 cm, 130 cm)
repeated measures analysis of variance (RM ANOVA). Given
that gender can affect cooperation (see 29 for a recent review)
and our sample was comprised of more females than males, all
analyses were also conducted including only female
participants. Analyses revealed the same pattern of results
indicating that gender did not affect performance in the present
task. Analysis revealed a significant main effect of center shelf
height, F(4,92) = 152.61, p < .001, η2p = .87 and a significant
task condition × direction × center shelf height interaction,
F(8,184) = 3.68, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.138. To decompose the
three-way interaction, additional RM ANOVAs were conducted
to directly compare the different task conditions. To control for
family-wise errors rate, a Bonferroni correction was applied (α
= 0.017). The results are shown in Table 1.
To examine whether the observation of an action is sufficient
to elicit recall processes, grasp height data were analyzed
using a 2 task condition (intra-, inter-individual) × 2 direction
(outer-to-center, center-to-outer) × 2 object position (left, right)
× 5 center shelf height (50 cm, 70 cm, 90 cm, 110 cm, 130 cm)
repeated measures analysis of variance (RM ANOVA).
Analysis indicated that grasp height was inversely related to
center shelf height (Figure 2), F(4,92) = 140.86, p <.001, η2p = .
86. There was no effect of direction or task condition,
demonstrating that grasp height was similar for the first and
return moves and for the intra- and inter-individual task
condition (Figure 2). The slopes for the best-fitting straight lines
ranged from -.18 to -.22 and all differed significantly from zero
(Table 2).
The grasp height data of the intra- and the inter-individual
task conditions were compared to the control task condition in
order to assess potential differences in control priority between
variable and fixed platform positions using a 2 task condition
(intra-individual, control) x 2 direction of movement (outer-to-
center, center-to-outer) x 2 object position (left, right) x 5 center
shelf height (50 cm, 70 cm, 90 cm, 110 cm, 130 cm) RM
ANOVA. Comparison between intra-individual and control task
conditions revealed that the interaction between task condition,
direction of movement, and shelf height was significant, F(4,92)
= 8.71, p = .001, η2p = .28. As the slope of the best-fitting
straight lines provide a good and robust estimate of the degree
of grasp posture adjustment, we applied the approach of
Cohen & Rosenbaum [1] and decomposed the significant
three-way interactions based on the steepness of the slopes
rather than employing post hoc pair wise comparisons. The
slopes of the best-fitting straight lines for the center-to-outer
moves in the control task condition were shallower (-.16 and -.
17 for object position left and right, respectively) than the
slopes for the center-to-outer moves in the intra-individual task
condition (- .22 and -.22 for object position left and right,
respectively, see Table 2).
Similarly, analysis of differences between the inter-individual
and control task condition revealed a significant three-way
interaction between the factors task condition, direction of
movement, and shelf height, F(4,92) = 4.38, p = .003, η2p = .16.
Again, the slopes of the best-fitting straight lines for the center-
to-outer moves in the control task condition were shallower (-.
16 and -.17 for object position left and right, respectively) than
the slopes for the center-to-outer moves in the inter-individual
task condition (- .19 and -.20 for object position left and right,
respectively, see Table 2).
To examine whether participants’ grasp heights of the return
moves are more similar compared to their own grasp heights of
the first moves or compared to their partners’ first move grasp
heights we calculated the slopes for the best-fitting straight
lines separately for each participant and direction (first, return)
during the inter-individual task condition. Slopes during the
return move of a given participant (e.g. A) were highly
Table 1. Results of the three repeated measures ANOVAs (intra-individual vs. inter-individual, intra-individual vs. control,
inter-individual vs. control) using the within-subject factors task condition (task), direction (dir), object position (pos), and
center shelf height (sh), α = 0.017.
 intra vs. inter  intra vs. control  inter vs. control
Variable F p η2p  F p η2p  F p η2p
task 0.35 .560 .02  0.01 .935 .00  0.26 .613 .01
dir 0.00 .985 .00  3.29 .083 .13  1.39 .251 .06
pos 0.68 .418 .03  0.04 .841 .00  0.33 .573 .01
sh 140.86 <.001 .86  125.77 <.001 .85  114.18 <.001 .83
task × dir 0.10 .754 .00  1.75 .199 .07  1.74 .200 .07
task × pos 0.10 .750 .00  1.69 .207 .07  2.43 .133 .10
task × sh 1.02 .385 .04  0.81 .470 .03  0.05 .981 .00
dir × pos 2.13 .158 .09  7.64 .011 .25  5.60 .027 .20
dir x sh 0.96 .402 .04  1.74 .189 .07  1.60 .182 .07
pos × sh 0.60 .661 .03  0.16 .960 .01  0.21 .931 .01
task × dir × pos 0.29 .596 .01  1.52 .230 .06  0.44 .513 .02
task × dir × sh 0.43 .720 .02  8.71 .001 .28  4.38 .003 .16
task × pos × sh 0.20 .938 .01  0.93 .450 .04  0.55 .702 .02
dir× pos × sh 0.73 .546 .03  0.31 .828 .01  0.48 .694 .02
task × dir × pos × sh 0.32 .863 .01  0.92 .421 .04  0.52 .718 .02
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0084662.t001
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correlated with the slopes during the first move of the same
participant (i.e., A, r = .74, p <.001), but not with the slopes
during the first move of their partner (i.e., B, r = .32, p = .131,
see Figure 3).
Discussion
The present experiment addressed two questions. First, we
asked whether the observation of an action is sufficient to elicit
plan recall processes during a sequential grasp-and-place task.
Second, we examined whether a simulated action plan
resembles a plan of how the observer would execute that
action (i.e., based on the motor representation) or a plan of the
actually observed action (i.e., based on the visual
representation).
With respect to our first question, our data indicate that the
observation of an action is indeed sufficient to elicit plan recall
processes. Overall, mean grasp heights for the first move
(outer-to-center) were inversely related to center target height
during both the intra- and inter-individual task conditions,
demonstrating that participants generated an action plan for the
first move, and did so to afford more comfortable and
controllable body postures when the object was placed onto
the center target [1].During return moves, participants grasped
the object at a similar height to that used in the first move,
indicating that they relied on plan recall [1]. If participants would
Figure 2.  Mean grasp heights (relative to plunger base) as a function of center shelf height during the intra-individual
task (triangles), inter-individual task (circles), and control task (squares) for the outer-to-center (panel A) and center-to-
outer moves (panel B).  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0084662.g002
Table 2. Slopes, intercepts, and correlations (r) for best-fitting straight lines relating grasp height (mm) to center shelf height
(mm) in outer-to-center and center-to-outer platform moves for each task condition.
  Outer-to-center  Center-to-outer
  Objectposition  Objectposition
  Left Right  Left Right
  Slope Intercept r Slope Intercept r  Slope Intercept r Slope Intercept r
Intra-individual  -.21** 448 0.979 -.20** 434 0.991  -.22** 457 0.986 -.22** 455 0.994
Inter-individual  -.19** 432 0.993 -.18*** 418 0.995  -.19** 429 0.988 -.20*** 440 0.996
Control  -.21*** 450 0.995 -.21** 454 0.986  -.16*** 0.397 0.996 -.17** 418 0.990
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0084662.t002
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have generated a new plan for the return move, this should
have resulted in similar grasp heights, as in the center-to-outer
moves of the control task condition. However, in the control
task condition, slopes for the center-to-outer moves were
significantly shallower compared to the slopes for the center-to-
outer moves, in both the intra- and inter-individual task
condition (i.e., the return moves in both tasks).These data
argue against the possibility that these findings arose solely
because participants attributed greater priority to control at the
variable (center) rather than at the fixed (outer) platform
heights, and thus support the notion that individuals utilized a
plan recall strategy when planning their grasp postures.
However it should be noted that participants did not strictly
optimize control at the end of the movement when planning
their first moves. Rather, grasp heights for the center-to-outer
moves in the control task condition also varied as a function of
center target height, indicating that some degree of control was
also assigned to the start of the movement. These findings are
in line with recent results from our laboratory [2,25,26]
suggesting that goal-directed planning is guided by a task-
specific constraint hierarchy in which specific constraints (e.g.
control at the start and at the end of a movement) are weighted
relative to each other in order to successfully attain the task
goal .
Importantly, grasp heights for the return moves were similar
regardless of whether participants had previously performed
the first move themselves (intra-individual task condition) or
whether they had observed their partner performing that move
(inter-individual task condition).These results are congruent
with previous research [10,30–32], and suggest that the
observation of the first movement triggered an internal
simulation of that action plan through the activation of
corresponding representations in the observer’s motor system.
It is thought that this common neural coding allows the
observer to understand other people’s emotions, intentions,
and actions [9,30,33],enables the observer to predict the
outcomes of the observed actions [8,10,34,35], and allows the
observer to extract features from the observed action that can
be integrated into their own actions [36–38]. Extending this
work, our data provide evidence that a simulated action plan
can be held in memory and recalled for subsequent actions. As
the generation of a new action plan is associated with cognitive
costs [39], relying on plan recall rather than plan generation is
a useful strategy to economize on these costs. The inference
that can be drawn is that the simulation of an action plan
through action observation is associated with similar cognitive
costs as the (self-) generation of that plan. Consequently,
analogous to recalling a self-generated action plan, reverting to
a simulated action plan is an effective strategy to reduce the
cognitive burden to the central nervous system.
With regards to the second question, the results of the
present study strongly indicate that a simulated action plan
resembles a plan of how the observer would execute that
action (i.e., based on the motor representation) rather than a
plan of the actually observed action (i.e., based on the visual
representation). In the inter-individual task, best-fitting slopes
Figure 3.  Scatter plot comparing return move slopes of a given participant with first move slopes of the same
participant (panel A) and with first move slopes of their partner (panel B) during the inter-individual task condition.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0084662.g003
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during the return move were highly correlated with the slopes
during the first move of the same participant, but not with the
slopes of their partner’s. Although previous research [40] has
shown that recall is based on information stored in extrinsic
coordinates (i.e., participants recalled the location where they
grasped the plunger rather than the adopted body posture), the
results of the present study indicate that participants did not
merely observe where their partner grasped the plunger during
the first move and then recalled that location and grasped the
plunger at the same height for the return move. Our data are
also in contrast to recent studies that provided evidence for
involuntary imitation in joint action contexts [41-43]. For
example, participant dyads in Sacheli et al. [43] grasped bottle-
shaped objects as synchronous as possible. Participants were
assigned asymmetric roles such that the Leader received
information about the type of grip used (power vs. precision)
whereas the Follower was instructed to perform either imitative
or complementary actions. Results showed that Followers
tended to imitate their partner even in the complementary
action context where imitation is detrimental to joint
performance.
Rather, our data suggests that observing the action triggered
a simulation of that action by activating the observer’s specific
motor representation of that action (i.e., how the observer
would perform that action) which can be kept in memory and
used for subsequent actions. These findings are in accordance
with studies who argue in favor of more flexible models of
perception-action coupling in where the action context takes in
a critical role in determining the relationship between action
observation and action execution [44-46]. Participants in the
study of van Schie et al. [46], for example, initiated identical
actions faster in an imitative context but non-identical actions
faster in a complementary context suggesting that participants
were able to inhibit the tendency to imitate the observed action.
Methodological differences between these studies might
account for the apparent divergent results. In the studies that
provided evidence for involuntary imitation [41-43], participants
performed synchronous actions embedded in realistic
interaction scenarios (i.e., together with a real human partner).
In contrast, previous studies that argue against the automatic
nature of imitation [44-46] employed only joint-like interactions
in where participants observed their partner displayed on a
computer monitor and responded accordingly. Given that we
employed a realistic interaction scenario, one possibility for the
absence of imitation effects in the present study might be
substantiated in the sequential character of our task (i.e., one
participant completed the movement before the partner
commenced his or her movement). Consequently, the time
delay between observed and (self-) executed action might
allow the observer to inhibit to act in a mimicking fashion.
Alternatively, unequal biomechanical costs associated with
the different movements might have contributed to the
deviating results between the present study and the study of
Sacheli et al. [43]. That is to say, in Sacheli et al. [43], the
tendency to imitate the partner’s motor action was primarily
evidenced by a change in maximum wrist height which, we
argue, would not likely result in substantial increases in
biomechanical costs. In contrast, if participants in the present
study were prone to imitate their partner (i.e., grasp the plunger
at the same height during the return move as their partner
during the first move), they might have had to adopt
uncomfortable and biomechanically costly grasp postures.
Consequently, simulating actions based on one’s own specific
motor representation is biomechanically and cognitively
advantageous and strengthens the existence of a cognitive
system that takes into account a person’s physical
competencies when interacting with the physical world [32].
Together, our results not only provide further evidence that
participants mentally simulate observed actions, but that these
simulated action plans are recalled and used for subsequent
own actions. Furthermore, a simulated action plan is likely to
resemble a plan based on the observer’s specific motor
representation rather than a plan of the actually observed
action performed by the interaction partner which provides
further evidence for a flexible mechanism of perception-action
coupling.
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